Readers of this blog know that since its inception in 2012, concurrent with the publication of the first edition of Amelia Earhart: The Truth at Last, I have focused exclusively on the Earhart disappearance, and virtually all of the 285 posts here deal with Earhart and closely related subjects.
Today we move away from the Earhart case, but only slightly, as we feature a Dec. 1, 1991 San Francisco Chronicle Sunday supplement article about Pearl Harbor by Fred Goerner, the bestselling author of The Search for Amelia Earhart (1966), the foremost Earhart researcher of his or any day, who was also intensely interested in the Pearl Harbor “debacle,” as he called it, and its possible relationship to the Earhart mess. (Boldface emphasis mine throughout.)
I’ve tried to reproduce the original look of the “This World” Sunday supplement, but it’s better to type out much of copy because the multi-column layout doesn’t allow for easy presentation. This is the first of two parts.
tary strategists who had been predicting such an attack for 20 years? If the U.S. military had broken Japanese secret codes, why didn’t somebody know what Japan was going to do?
Six investigations during World War II, and two inquiries in the year after the war, including a joint congressional probe, failed to produce satisfactory answers. Argument continues, and vicious accusations still abound. Hundreds of books and articles have been written about Pearl Harbor trying to assign responsibility to individuals and/or departments of the American government and military. For some the subject is extraordinarily bitter and larded with vituperation.
There are many who allege President Franklin Roosevelt withheld vital intelligence from Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, commander of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, and General Walter C. Short, commander of U.S. Army forces at Pearl Harbor, to allow the attack to occur as a means of branding Japan as an immoral aggressor and to being America into World War II on a time of passionate patriotism. Roosevelt was at once one of the most loved and most hated of America’s presidents. Even 50 years later, dozens of authors and scholars are trying to establish that FDR was somehow a traitor to his country and to the U.S. Navy he loved so much.
And a recently published book alleges that Prime Minister Winston Churchill knew the Japanese carrier fleet was sailing toward Hawaii but, in order to bring the United States into the war, did not share that intelligence with President Roosevelt.
Only now, 50 years later, are historians beginning to understand what really happened on the morning that changed the world.
World War II took more than three years of my own life as I served with the U.S. Navy Seabees in the Pacific, and I had often wondered about the Pearl Harbor debacle. It was not until 1961, however, that a CBS documentary I was writing brought me into contact with Fleet Admiral Chester Nimitz, who commanded U.S. Pacific naval forces during most of the war. It began a friendship that lasted until the admiral’s death in 1966.
Nimitz had been ordered to Pearl Harbor to replace Admiral Kimmell, who would receive the bulk of the blame for American unpreparedness, just days after the attack. Roosevelt directed Nimitz to “get the hell out of Pearl and stay there until the war is won.”
On Christmas morning, 1941, the U.S. Navy flying boat carrying Nimitz circled Pearl Harbor. He could see most of the main anchorage, which was covered with black fuel oil and floating debris. The capsized battleships Oklahoma and Utah were clearly visible, and farther down the harbor he could see Arizona, West Virginia and California sunk in deeper water with only the topsides exposed. Dozens of small power boats were circling in the harbor, picking up the bloated bodies of dead sailors who had been blown off their ships by Japanese bombs and torpedoes. There were 2,403 Americans killed in the attack, including 68 civilians.
Nimitz found Kimmell a disheartened man. A spent bullet had struck Kimmell during the attack, but he had not been wounded. He told Nimitz he wished the bullet had killed him.
Kimmell returned to the U.S. mainland in what many considered to be disgrace. Nimitz restored American confidence, projected American forces across the Pacific and accepted the final Japanese surrender aboard the USS Missouri in Tokyo Bay, September 2, 1945.
To my surprise, Nimitz did not consider the Japanese attack upon Pearl Harbor to be a complete disaster; in fact, he believed it to have been a Japanese strategic failure. He pointed to the inflexibility of the Japanese plan, with its emphasis upon attacking battleships (most of which were later repaired and saw war action) and ignoring Navy storage tanks, which contained 4,500,000 barrels of fuel oil. Had those been destroyed, the U.S. victory in the Pacific might have been delayed six months or more.
Nimitz also felt Admiral Chuichi Nagumo, the Japanese attacking force commander, had missed the opportunity to truly disable American forces by limiting the attack to two air strikes. Had the Japanese plan been more bold, an invasion and occupation of the Hawaiian Islands might have succeeded. That would have been a complete disaster for the United States.
As to Kimmel’s responsibility for American unpreparedness for the air attack, Nimitz would not assign it. He called it a “hazard of command“ and he indicated it could have happened to anyone, himself included. He stressed that almost everyone in the U.S. military had believed the Japanese would strike at Malaya and probably Guam and the Philippines. That was a fatal estimation. Instead of stretching its imagination — planning for what the Japanese could do — American military intelligence was busy speculating about what the Japanese would do.
Nimitz felt it might be considered a blessing that Kimmel had not gotten brief notice of the true Japanese intention. He might have commanded the American fleet to sail for open water, and had the Japanese planes bombed and torpedoed the ships there, they would have been lost forever in deep water and the human casualties would have been much greater.
Nimitz also believed that ignorance and arrogance — both American and Japanese — played major roles in Pearl Harbor. In 1941, Americans were generally ignorant about Japan and its people, believing America completely superior in leadership, equipment and fighting ability. The prevalent military and civilian attitude was that Japan would not dare attack America.
At the same time, many in Japan saw America as a weak and divided nation that could never match Japan in spirit and willingness to sacrifice. Japan believed it could overwhelm American forces early in a war, and that America would ask for peace on Japan’s terms.
Nimitz did not accept any of the theories about a Roosevelt conspiracy to withhold information obtained through secret Japanese codes, but he believed it would be many years, perhaps several decades, before highly classified records dealing with American cryptology activities prior to Pearl Harbor would be released and the full truth known. When that day arrived, he admonished, historians should pay particular attention to what exactly the British cryptologists knew before the attack.
In the winter of 1967, I journeyed to see Admiral Kimmel at his home in Groton, Connecticut. It was a cold, snowy day, well matched to his attitude. He was brought into the small living room in a wheelchair. His balding head glistened in the overhead light, and he squinted at me as if trying to determine whether I was friend or foe. At 85, the fire still burned.
To call Kimmel bitter is an understatement. He raged at me. He called Roosevelt a “damned traitor,” and put Adm. Harold Start, the chief of naval operations in 1941, in the same category. “Stark picked me up when I returned to D.C. from Pearl Harbor, and he lied about everything,” Kimmel said.
Kimmel believed that Roosevelt, Stark and Army Chief George Marshall had purposely withheld vital intelligence that would have given him a chance to prepare for the Japanese air attack, and then they had made him the scapegoat, ruining his career and abandoning him to be scorned by history. He told of vile letters he and his family had received over the years and said lies had been told about him and repeated as truth by the media. In anecdote, Kimmel’s wife, Dorothy, was supposed to have returned from Hawaii by plane, mumping wounded Americans so her furniture could accompany her. The truth was, Dorothy Kimmel has not been at Pearl Harbor. The entire story was fabricated.
For more than two hours, Kimmel wove an intricate scenario of disappearing records, reluctant witnesses, deceit and chicanery.
His voice became a shout as he said, “That’s why I’m still living. I’m going to be vindicated! Some people are working on it right now.”
Kimmel died five months later, without the vindication he so wanted. (End of Part I.)